



Obesity and Unhealthy Consumption: The Public-Policy 
Case for Placing a Federal Sin Tax on Sugary Beverages 
Jonathan Cummings† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A growing body of research has established an empirical link be-
tween consumption of sugary beverages and numerous health problems. 1  
Sugary beverages, such as soda, contribute to obesity, heart disease, and 
type 2 diabetes.2  Unsurprisingly, this empirical evidence has led scien-
tists and researchers in the field to conclude that “a compelling case can 
be made for the need for reduced consumption of these beverages.”3  Put 
simply, this research postulates that expensive and often deadly health 
problems related to obesity have been fueled in large part by overcon-
sumption of sugary beverages; therefore, a strong public policy case ex-
ists for reducing the consumption of these beverages.4 
Yet, while few people disagree that reduced consumption of sugary 
beverages is a desirable goal for American society, many people disagree 
about how to reduce it.  Contentious debate surrounds the issue of 
whether the federal government should enact nationwide policies aimed 
at curbing sugary-beverage consumption.5  More specifically, most pub-
lic debate has centered on whether a federal sin tax on sugary beverages 
should be implemented.6 
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 1. Kelly D. Brownell et al., The Public Health and Economic Benefits of Taxing Sugar-
Sweetened Beverages, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1599, 1599 (2009). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. The New England Journal of Medicine study recommends a tax on sugary beverages.  For a 
complete definition of what constitutes a sugary beverage, see id. at 1599. 
 6. See Rachel E. Morse, Note, Resisting the Path of Least Resistance: Why the Texas “Pole 
Tax” and the New Class of Modern Sin Taxes Are Bad Policy, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 189 
(2009) (discussing why sin taxes are bad public policy and are regressive); see also Katherine Man-
gu-Ward, 5 Myths We Need to Can About Soda Taxes, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/25/AR2009092502015.html. 
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Much of the media attention debating the merits of a federal sin tax 
on sugary beverages was in reaction to a recent study published by the 
New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM).7  The NEJM study recom-
mends the implementation of a federal sin tax on sugary beverages that 
aims to reduce the consumption of sugary beverages, with the overall 
goal of reducing obesity-related health problems.8  The NEJM sin-tax 
proposal would impose a one-cent-per-ounce tax on certain high-sugar 
beverages, which would amount to roughly a 20% increase in the overall 
price of most sugary beverages.9 
This proposed sin tax differs sharply in two ways from similar taxes 
already in place in approximately thirty-three states.10  First, the tax is 
recommended at the federal level, whereas similar taxes have been state 
or local thus far.11  Second, the amount of the proposed federal tax is 
much higher than most state taxes.12 
Thus far, the idea of a federal sin tax on sugary beverages exists on-
ly in its most inchoate form—as a mere public policy proposal by a high-
ly respected academic journal.  Serious consideration has yet to reach 
either the House or Senate floor.13  Most discussion and debate about the 
proposed sin tax has so far been media driven, with various media organ-
izations and bloggers reporting, attacking, or supporting the idea of a sin 
tax on sugary beverages.14  In fact, comments from President Obama’s 
interview with Men’s Health Magazine spawned a large amount of the 
major media discussion.15  With his usual grasp of the countervailing 
tensions in policy formation, President Obama was quoted as saying: 
“Look, people’s attitude is that they don’t necessarily want Big Brother 
telling them what to eat or drink, and I understand that. It is true, though, 
                                                            
 7. See Brownell, supra note 1. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1602. 
 10. Id. at 1602–64. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 1602. 
 13. Janet Adamy, Soda Tax Weighed to Pay for Healthcare, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2009, at A4. 
The Senate Finance Committee briefly considered a tax on soda as a means of paying for President 
Obama’s healthcare overhaul.  N. Gregory Mankiw, Can a Soda Tax Save Us from Ourselves?, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 6, 2010, at BU4. This Comment will assume that any future federal proposal would be 
nearly identical to the NEJM proposal discussed infra. 
 14. See, e.g., Kelley Weiss, Soda Tax Could Shake Up Industry, NPR, Oct. 14, 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113634715&ps=cprs; Adamy, supra note 13; 
Mangu-Ward, supra note 6. 
 15. David Saltonstall, President Obama Says “Sin Tax” on Sodas is Food for Thought, Despite 
Gov. Paterson’s Failed Proposal, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Sept. 9, 2009, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/2009/09/08/2009-09-08_president_obama_says_sin_ 
tax_on_sodas_is_food_for_thought.html#ixzz0RK477RPA. 
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that if you wanted to make a big impact on people’s health in this coun-
try, reducing things like soda consumption would be helpful.”16 
President Obama’s comments cut to the heart of the matter: the 
public is wary of policies that attempt to influence free choice and con-
sumption behavior.  Promoting public health is the prerogative of the 
federal government,17 however, and increased empirical correlation be-
tween sugary-beverage consumption and health problems might demand 
significant federal action.18 
As the media attention indicates, the NEJM’s proposed federal sin 
tax on sugary beverages is a pivotal public policy decision with far-
reaching implications. The science, research, and statistics surrounding 
the obesity epidemic indicate that the stakes are high.  If unaddressed, 
obesity will likely surpass many other serious health ailments as the main 
killer of Americans, and the main burden on the healthcare system.19 
Consequently, policy-making action in the form of a federal sin tax 
on sugary beverages may not only be justified, but may also be neces-
sary.  On the other hand, government action aimed at influencing an in-
dividual’s dietary choices cuts sharply against the notion of liberty and 
personal responsibility that pervades the United States.  For citizens who 
highly value the concept of unadulterated free choice, levying a sin tax 
on sugary beverages seems to be the quintessential step down the slip-
pery slope of public policy making that will lead closer and closer to the 
feared “nanny state,” or as President Obama stated: “Big Brother telling 
you what you can do and can’t do.”20 
Despite the contentious nature of a federal sin tax, strong arguments 
support the implementation of such a tax.  This Comment argues that the 
proposed sin tax on sugary beverages is sound policy and Congress 
should implement the tax in order to combat and address the obesity epi-
demic because (1) consumers are subject to cognitive and informational 
defects that affect consumers’ abilities to make the best welfare-
generating decisions, and (2) sugary-beverage consumption causes 
healthcare-related externalities that the current price of sugary beverages 
do not reflect. 
Part II explores in more detail the science and statistics surrounding 
the obesity epidemic and the proposed NEJM sin tax on sugary beverag-
                                                            
 16. Id. 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I. One enumerated power of Congress is the ability to “tax and spend for 
the general welfare.” 
 18. See Brownell, supra note 1. 
 19. Id. at 1601–02; see also, Rogan Kersh & James A. Morone, Obesity, Courts, and the New 
Politics of Public Health, 30 J.  HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L., 839, 842 (2005). 
 20. See Saltonstall, supra note 15. 
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es.21  Part III argues that the sin tax should be implemented because con-
sumers suffer from cognitive and information defects.  Part IV discusses 
and articulates the externality-based justifications for imposing a sin tax 
on sugary beverages.  Part V addresses and counters three common ob-
jections to sin taxes and paternalistic policies: that such policies decrease 
autonomy, are inherently regressive, and are susceptible to more invasive 
government regulation.  Finally, Part VI offers a conclusion and re-
articulates the thesis of the Comment: a federal sin tax on sugary beve-
rages should be implemented. 
II. THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC: NATIONAL PROBLEMS COMPEL NATIONAL 
SOLUTIONS 
In the past three decades, the proportion of American adults who 
are obese has more than doubled—from 15% in the mid-1970s to ap-
proximately one-third of all American adults in the current decade.22   
The health risks associated with obesity are numerous and deadly.23  Part 
II of this Comment first presents a general background on the public-
health crisis of obesity, illustrating why obesity is rightly referred to as 
an epidemic.  The second section of Part II describes the proposed sin tax 
offered by the NEJM in more detail.  This section describes how such a 
sin tax would work in practice, and how it differs from similar sin taxes 
already in place in some states. 
A. The Obesity Epidemic 
Obesity is a major public health problem in present-day America.  
According to the Surgeon General of the United States, approximately 
300,000 deaths per year are associated with obesity-related health prob-
lems.24  Serious health problems result from obesity because it creates an 
increased risk of heart disease, high blood pressure, type 2 diabetes, arth-
                                                            
 21. See Brownell, supra note 1. 
 22. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2008 50 
(2008) http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus08.pdf. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Overweight and Obesity: Health Consequences, OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., 
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/fact_consequences.html (last visited June 
19, 2010).  A 2005 article from the Journal of the American Medical Association estimates a more 
conservative number of approximately 112,000 deaths associated with obesity. See Katherine M. 
Flegal et al., Excess Deaths Associated with Underweight, Overweight, and Obesity, 293 JAMA 
1861, 1861 (2005).  Regardless of the exact number of deaths associated with obesity, this Comment 
assumes that obesity is a sufficiently important public health problem to justify a nationwide policy 
response—a federal sin tax on sugary beverages. While determining how important a particular 
health concern must be to justify a national policy response is an important issue, it is a complex 
issue that goes beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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ritis, asthma, pregnancy complications, certain cancers, and depression.25  
Moreover, the Surgeon General warns that “[l]eft unabated, [being] 
overweight and obes[e] may soon cause as much preventable disease and 
death as cigarette smoking.”26 
Not only does obesity cause personal health problems and death, 
but it is also estimated that obesity costs American’s $147 billion per 
year.27  And while experts have performed numerous studies to calculate 
the direct costs that obesity has on our public and private healthcare sys-
tems, the indirect costs such as production loss would most likely in-
crease the cost of obesity on society.28 
Unsurprisingly, obesity does not have one cause, it has many.29  
Some common causes of obesity include: watching too much televi-
sion,30 poor diet and unhealthy eating,31 environmental factors,32 and ge-
netic predisposition.33 
Yet, the challenges and problems raised by the obesity epidemic are 
not insurmountable. This is largely because most causes of obesity are 
environmental, and thus are susceptible to influence and improvement 
through policy-making and changes in behavior.34  The Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC) articulates this phenomenon by stat-
ing that “American society has become ‘obesogenic,’ characterized by 
environments that promote increased food intake, nonhealthful foods, 
and physical inactivity.”35  Accordingly, changing the environments that 
contribute to obesity will require a combination of both personal changes 
                                                            
 25. See SURGEON GEN., supra note 24. 
 26. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT 
OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 2001 XIII (2001), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/ 
calltoaction/CalltoAction.pdf. 
 27. Study Estimates Medical Cost of Obesity May Be as High as $147 Billion Annually, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2009/r090727.ht
m. 
 28. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY STATISTICS (2010), 
http://win.niddk.nih.gov/publications/PDFs/stat904z.pdf; see also  David B. Allison et al., The Di-
rect Health Care Cost of Obesity in the United States, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1194, 1199 (1999). 
 29. David Burnett, Fast-Food Lawsuits and the Cheeseburger Bill: Critiquing Congress’s 
Response to the Obesity Epidemic, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 357, 360 (2007). 
 30. Thomas N. Robinson, Reducing Children’s Television Viewing to Prevent Obesity, 282 
JAMA 1561, 1561 (1999). 
 31. See, supra note 29, (citing Mary K. Sedula, Prevalence of Attempting Weight Loss and 
Strategies for Controlling Weight, 282 JAMA 1353, 1357–58 (1999)). 
 32. Simone A. French et al., Environmental Influences on Eating and Physical Activity, 22 
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 309, 309 (2001). 
 33. Genomics Resources: Obesity and Genomics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/resources/diseases/obesity/obesedit.htm (last updated 
April 20, 2010). 
 34. See Burnett, supra note 29, at 361. 
 35. Obesity and Overweight, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/ (last visited June 19, 2010). 
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in behavior on the one hand, and action by public health officials on the 
other. Without neglecting the important role that individuals must play in 
combating obesity, the primary means of affecting the various obesogen-
ic environmental factors is through public action and policy. 
The recognition that obesity is largely an environmental problem 
has motivated researchers, scientists, and policy makers to identify and 
study areas where changes of environment will most effectively influ-
ence healthier decision making. For example, as recently as July 29, 
2009, the CDC issued a report titled Recommended Community Strate-
gies and Measurements to Prevent Obesity in the United States.36  The 
report outlines local strategies, among other things, to increase the avail-
ability of healthier foods and encourage physical activity in small locali-
ties, such as school districts.37  Another prominent example of public 
efforts to fight obesity has focused on First Lady Michelle Obama’s an-
nounced campaign to combat childhood obesity on a national scale.38  
The announced initiative is “aimed at revamping the way American 
children eat and play—reshaping school lunches, playgrounds and even 
medical checkups—with the goal of eliminating childhood obesity within 
a generation.”39  Both the CDC and Mrs. Obama’s initiatives are geared 
toward encouraging healthier choices and behavior. 
While public policy actions that aim at encouraging better and heal-
thier choices are necessary, however, combating obesity effectively de-
mands policies that discourage unhealthy behavior.  Unsurprisingly, pol-
icies that discourage certain unhealthy behaviors, like sin taxes, are much 
more controversial.  The following subpart generally outlines the empiri-
cal study and policy recommendations proposed by Kelly Brownell et al., 
in the NEJM study titled The Public Health and Economic Benefits of 
Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages.40 As this Comment argues, such a 
proposal is sound public policy and should be implemented by Congress 
in order to help combat the obesity epidemic. 
B. The Public Health and Economic Benefits of Taxing Sugar-Sweetened 
Beverages 
In the NEJM study published on October 15, 2009, a group of 
scientists, researchers, and doctors articulated the policy benefits of a 
                                                            
 36. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Recommended Community Strategies and 
Measurements to Prevent Obesity in the United States, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP: 
RECOMMENDATIONS & REPS., July 24, 2009, at 1, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr5807.pdf. 
 37. See id. at 7, 14. 
 38. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Childhood Obesity Battle is Taken Up by First Lady, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 9, 2010, at A16. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Brownell, supra note 1. 
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federal tax on sugary beverages.41 The NEJM proposal advocates for a 
one-cent-per-ounce excise tax on sugary beverages on a nationwide 
scale.42 The NEJM study opens with the remark that “the consumption of 
sugar-sweetened beverages has been linked to risks for obesity, diabetes, 
and heart disease; therefore, a compelling case can be made for the need 
for reduced consumption of these beverages.”43  The NEJM study subs-
tantiates its policy recommendation with various empirical studies, both 
national and international, linking the consumption of sugary beverages 
with increased weight gain.44  The studies conclusively showed that indi-
viduals who consumed one or more sugary beverages per day had in-
creased body weight.45  In its concluding remarks, the NEJM study dec-
lares: “The science base linking the consumption of sugar-sweetened 
beverages to the risk of chronic diseases is clear.”46 
The NEJM study, recognizing that some state-level taxes on sugary 
beverages already exist, specifically emphasizes that thirty-three states 
currently impose some sort of tax on sugary beverages.47  But the state 
taxes fail to help ameliorate the obesity epidemic in two respects.48  First, 
the existing state taxes are “too small to affect consumption”49—the tax-
es are too small to deter people from overconsumption.  Second, the 
funds generated from the taxes do not go to programs connected with the 
                                                            
 41. Id. The NEJM study indicates a certain amount of sugar in a beverage would qualify it to 
be subject to the excise tax. At the levels that the NEJM recommends, soda would be the main beve-
rage targeted by such a tax, but beverages such as sports drinks would also fall within the definition 
of a sugary beverage. Issues and problems raised by defining what constitutes a sugary beverage—
issues of line drawing—are beyond the scope of this Comment. Rather, this Comment assumes that 
beverages with a high sugar content are sufficiently unhealthy to be the subject of a tax. Some dis-
cussion of line-drawing problems are raised and discussed in Part V.C, infra. 
 42. Brownell, supra note 1, at 1602. 
 43. Id. at 1599 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 44. See, e.g., id. (citing Vasanti S. Malik et al., Intake of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and 
Weight Gain: A Systematic Review, 84 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 274 (2006); Lenny R. Vartanian 
et al., Effects of Soft Drink Consumption on Nutrition and Health: A Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 667 (2007)). 
 45. A cursory summary of some of these findings include: “[T]he risk of becoming obese in-
creased by 60% for every additional serving of sugar-sweetened beverages per day”; “positive asso-
ciations between the intake of sugar-sweetened beverages and body weight”; “total energy intake 
and body weight increased when subjects were given 530 kcal of sugar-sweetened beverages per day 
for 3 weeks but decreased when subjects were given noncaloric sweetened beverages for the same 
length of time”; and “the risk of diabetes among women who consumed one or more servings of 
sugar-sweetened beverages per day was nearly double the risk among women who consumed less 
than one serving of sugar-sweetened beverages per month.” Brownell, supra note 1, at 1599–1600. 
 46. Id. at 1604. 
 47. Id. at 1599 (citing a mean tax rate for the state soda-taxes of 5.2%). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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treatment and prevention of obesity-related health ailments.50  The sin tax 
proposed by the NEJM would cure both these problems. 
The first goal of the proposed sin tax aims at reducing the overall 
consumption of sugary beverages, not just raising revenue.51  Any tax 
must be substantially high enough so that there is a clear economic ad-
vantage to not purchasing an undesirable product.52  The NEJM study 
recommends a tax that will amount to a 15–20% increase in the overall 
price of an average (twenty ounces) sugary beverage.53  This price in-
crease should be sufficient to reduce consumption to healthier levels. 
The second goal of the proposed tax is to directly link the revenue 
raised from the taxes to health-related initiatives.54  The study suggests 
using the tax revenue to pay for healthcare programs related to the prob-
lems caused by obesity and to pay for education programs that will in-
crease knowledge about smart and healthy food consumption.55 
In sum, the NEJM proposal to levy a sin tax on sugary beverages 
represents an approach to combating the obesity epidemic never before 
undertaken at the federal level. Taxing sugary beverages at a level that 
should deter consumption, not just raise revenue,56 is a policy approach 
previously associated only with the consumption of alcohol and ciga-
rettes.57  Consequently, the possible expansion of government regulation 
into another area of lifestyle decision making has raised many concerns 
and produced vehement dissenters.  The levying of a federal sin tax on 
sugary beverages to combat obesity, however, is supported by two sepa-
rate but equally compelling arguments.  Part III supports the levying of a 
sin tax on sugary beverages by illustrating how consumers suffer from 
cognitive defects and information failure.  In particular, consumers may 
have limited foresight and bounded rationality and are thus more likely 
                                                            
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1604. 
 52. Cigarette taxes currently in place at the federal and state level exhibit the type of tax rates 
necessary to curb consumption of an undesirable product. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1602. 
 54. Id. at 1599. 
 55. Some proposed uses for the revenue include “support [for] childhood nutrition programs, 
obesity-prevention programs, or healthcare for the uninsured. . . . ” Id. at 1603. 
 56. See Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes in Developed 
Countries, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1225–26 (2005) (discussing the difference between small junk-
food taxes that are aimed at raising revenue in contrast to higher “fat taxes” that are aimed at in-
fluencing consumer choice); see also Barak Y. Orbach, The New Regulatory Era—An Introduction, 
51 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 563 (2009). 
 57. Strnad, supra note 56, at 1239 (“There are parallel literatures concerning tobacco and alco-
hol taxes that make all of these tasks much easier. Many of the issues involving cigarette and alcohol 
policies are similar to the issues for food policy, and many of the policy alternatives, including taxa-
tion, are similar.”). 
2010] Federal Sin Tax on Sugary Beverages 281 
to make unhealthy choices about proper levels of sugary-beverage con-
sumption. 
III. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A SIN-TAX POLICY 
One of the major premises underlying the federal58 implementation 
of sin taxes—and other general regulation59—is that individual consum-
ers may not be perfectly rational actors.60  This premise cuts against the 
traditional model in neoclassical economics of individual consumers as 
perfectly “rational actors” that maximize utility.61  Doubts about the 
theoretical assumption that consumers are perfectly rational welfare max-
imizers are largely based on empirical studies which consistently show 
that consumers suffer from cognitive defects and information failure.62  
Rather than assume that every consumer will act in a perfectly rational 
manner, critics of the rational-actor model emphasize that regulations 
should imbue an “economic analysis of law that is informed by a more 
accurate conception of choice, one that reflects a better understanding of 
human behavior and its wellsprings.”63 
According to the critics of the rational-actor model, most consum-
ers are not perfectly rational actors because, among other things,64 con-
sumers suffer from a lack of perfect foresight, and are subject to bounded 
rationality.65  When consumers suffer from such cognitive failures, it is 
likely that they are not making consumption choices that maximize their 
welfare.66  In light of these failures, government regulation aimed at 
helping people promote their own welfare, such as a sin tax on sugary 
beverages, is both justified and necessary. 
                                                            
 58. This premise is not unique to federal regulation. See discussion supra, at Part II. 
 59. See Orbach, supra note 56, at 561 (discussing how the recent financial-market collapse of 
2008 was caused by a deregulation mentality, and how the collapse reinvigorated the need for gov-
ernment regulation). 
 60. Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Eco-
nomics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–78 (1998) (discussing empirical studies supporting claims that 
consumers have bounded rationality, bounded self interest, and bounded will power); see also Or-
bach, supra note 56, at 566. 
 61. Jolls, supra note 60, at 1476 (discussing the foundations of standard economic principles). 
 62. The assertion that consumers suffer from cognitive defects and information failure is sup-
ported by “ample empirical evidence that documents patterns of behavioral biases.” Orbach, supra 
note 56, at 566; see also Jolls, supra note 60, at 1471. See also infra Part III.A. 
 63. Jolls, supra note 60, at 1473. 
 64. This Comment focuses on two of the better-documented cognitive deficiencies, but this 
discussion is nonexhaustive, as other types of cognitive failures affect consumers’ ability to function 
in a perfectly rational manner. See Jolls, supra note 60, at 1479. 
 65. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003); see also Jolls, supra note 60, at 1477–78 (discussing bounded ratio-
nality). 
 66. Sunstein, supra note 65, at 1168–69. 
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Consumers who overconsume sugary beverages, to the detriment of 
their own welfare, likely suffer from a lack of perfect foresight, and are 
subject to bounded rationality.  This Part will first explore how consum-
ers suffer from a lack of perfect foresight in their choice to overconsume 
sugary beverages.  Next, this Part will discuss how information failure in 
the form of bounded rationality affects consumer choice when consum-
ing sugary beverages.  Because overconsumers of sugary beverages are 
likely subject to these cognitive and information failures, government 
intervention and regulation in the form of a sin tax should be imple-
mented in order to help consumers maximize their health and overall 
welfare. 
A. Lack of Perfect Foresight and the Overconsumption of Sugary Beve-
rages 
According to many commentators, most consumers suffer from a 
“lack of perfect foresight.”67  This means that consumers “may not un-
derstand the connection between . . . eating unhealthful food and subse-
quent health outcomes at the time they initially consume.”68  Put another 
way, consumer choice is unlikely to maximize welfare when a consumer 
insufficiently or entirely neglects the future effects of a present consump-
tion choice. 
The cognitive failure associated with imperfect foresight directly 
cuts against the theoretical “rational actor” and the accompanying pre-
sumption that “people do an excellent job making choices, or at least that 
they do a far better job than third parties could possibly do. . . . ”69  Aca-
demics like Cass Sunstein70 have found that “there is little empirical sup-
port” for the presumption that people always make better choices than 
third parties, which is due largely in part to consumers’ inability to con-
nect present-consumption choices with future risks.71  To support this 
claim that an unfettered choice system does not produce the best results, 
Sunstein offers evidence of rising obesity rates in the United States.72  
Sunstein reasons that because obesity causes well-known serious health 
risks, “it is quite fantastic to suggest that everyone is choosing the optim-
al diet . . . . ”73  The rising rates of obesity and the known serious health 
risks that accompany obesity indicate that many consumers lack the ra-
                                                            
 67. Strnad, supra note 56, at 1255. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Sunstein, supra note 65, at 1167. 
 70. Cass Sunstein is the Karl N. Llewellyn Service Professor of Jurisprudence at the University 
of Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science. 
 71. Sunstein, supra note 65, at 1167. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1167–68. 
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tionality to connect present consumption choices with the future effects 
of those choices.74 
Moreover, other risk-associated consumption behaviors, such as 
heavy drinking and smoking, collectively produce over 500,000 prema-
ture deaths each year.75  These statistics offer further proof that many 
Americans are not making choices that are completely in their best inter-
ests when it comes to deciding how much alcohol to drink or whether to 
smoke cigarettes. Evidence of such serious health-related harm is likely 
one of the reasons that cigarettes and alcohol consumption are historical-
ly subject to a paternalistic sin tax.  As Sunstein puts it, “In these cir-
cumstances, people’s choices cannot reasonably be thought, in all do-
mains, to be the best means of promoting their well-being.”76 
Much of the literature surrounding imperfect foresight and its effect 
on consumers involves studies done on cigarette smokers. These studies 
indicate that “[h]eavy smokers appear to understand the general risks for 
all smokers, but do not personalize these risks.”77  Additionally, smoking 
research illustrates how the “short-run benefits of smoking a few ciga-
rettes will appear to outweigh any costs.”78  Again, these observations 
illustrate how consumers can act irrationally when they make present 
dietary choices without considering future impacts on health. 
The proposed sin tax on sugary beverages is a governmental policy 
that would help reduce the effects of imperfect foresight.  Sin taxes of a 
sufficient magnitude, such as the proposed tax in the NEJM,79 force the 
consumer to immediately pay more for consuming an unhealthy product.  
The increased price gives the consumer an economic reason, in addition 
to a health-related reason, to reduce or even eliminate present consump-
tion levels.  Basic economic principles suggest that a higher price would 
decrease consumption because the consumer immediately pays more for 
the pleasure of consuming the product.  Moreover, when it comes to 
price increases of food, consumers are generally price sensitive; consum-
ers respond more readily to increases in food prices.80  This information 
indicates that while consumers may have limited foresight when it comes 
                                                            
 74. Id. at 1168. 
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to long-term health-related decisions, consumers will lower their con-
sumption in order to adjust to higher prices of a good.81 
Perhaps most importantly, reducing the effects of imperfect fore-
sight vis-à-vis a sin tax should have the ultimate effect of increasing in-
dividual and aggregate welfare. This increase is largely because “[t]axes 
on items with short-run benefits and long-run costs tell our current selves 
to take into account the welfare of our future selves.”82  From a policy 
perspective, increasing the general welfare is a paramount duty of the 
government and should continue to be the prerogative of the government 
through policies such as sin taxes. 
The obesity epidemic and the growing evidentiary correlation be-
tween sugary-beverage consumption and obesity indicate that American 
consumers lack perfect foresight in regard to the decision of how many 
sugary beverages to consume.  Because consumers, in choosing 
to overconsume sugary beverages, are likely not acting in their future 
best interest, policies that attempt to influence consumer choice in order 
to reduce sugary-beverage consumption, such as taxing at a high enough 
level to curb consumption, are a legitimate and even necessary response 
to this societal problem.  Moreover, given effectiveness of sin taxes in 
deterring the overconsumption of products like tobacco,83 it can be ex-
pected that a similar tax on sugary beverages will also reduce consump-
tion to healthier levels. 
B.  Consumers Have Bounded Rationality 
When making choices about what and how much to consume, con-
sumers rely on a combination of information, preference, experience, and 
other personal factors in making optimal choices—consumer choice is an 
inherently subjective activity.  These consumption choices may not be 
optimal, however, because many American consumers are subject to 
what academics refer to as “bounded rationality.”84  Bounded rationality 
refers to the “obvious fact that human cognitive abilities are not infinite.  
We have limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories.”85  
In the context of choosing an optimal diet, a consumer may suffer from 
bounded rationality because “it may be too costly or difficult to unravel 
the relationship between various eating patterns and disease.”86  Without 
                                                            
 81. See supra note 80. 
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 83. Strnad, supra note 56, at 1245–47. 
 84. Jolls, supra note 60, at 1477–78. 
 85. Id. at 1477. 
 86. Strnad, supra note 56, at 1254. 
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full information about the health consequences of food, “individuals will 
be unable to choose an optimal diet.”87 
Even though the availability of information about foods is increas-
ing,88 “processing all of this information is costly.”89  People must put 
time and energy into researching or finding a diet, or avoiding certain 
food choices.90  For many people, it is too inconvenient or too costly to 
spend time and energy processing the nutritional information, even when 
the information is easily accessible.91  Consumers who are subject to 
bounded rationality ignore information that might otherwise influence 
better consumption decisions. As a result, consumers who lack this in-
formation may not choose an optimal diet.92 
Yet, while consumers’ bounded rationality limits the effectiveness 
of increased information, “consumers do respond strongly to food pric-
es.”93  Seemingly, consumers respond to price more immediately than 
they respond to nutritional information.94  These studies indicate that as-
sumptions of consumer rationality are often dubious—except when it 
comes to price increases of basic necessities like food and drink.95  Ac-
cordingly, even though consumers are subject to bounded rationality and 
cannot efficiently or effectively process all the information available to 
make the best welfare-generating decisions, consumers do respond to 
price increases whether or not they process a product’s nutritional infor-
mation correctly. 
The informational failure associated with bounded rationality pro-
vides strong support for implementing a sin tax on sugary beverages. 
Regardless of how much information a consumer must process, empirical 
evidence indicates that price is the one factor that consumers seem to 
readily process and understand.96  For whatever reason, most consumers 
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do not act irrationally when it comes to a good’s price.97  Consumers 
who may not be able to rationally process the optimal amount of sugary 
beverages to include in a particular diet will nonetheless take into ac-
count a price increase, and an increase in price would likely lead to de-
terred consumption.98  In light of this fact, a sin tax to deter consumption 
of an unhealthy product, like sugary beverages, is an effective manner in 
which the government can help the consumer make healthier consump-
tion choices. 
IV. EXTERNALITIES: ACCOUNTING FOR THE TRUE COSTS OF OBESITY 
In addition to the welfare-based and paternalistic justifications for 
levying a federal sin tax on sugary beverages discussed in Part III, a sin 
tax on sugary beverages is also justified by currently unaccounted-for 
externalities: obesity-related healthcare costs.99 Although Arthur Cecil 
Pigou did not coin the term, “externalities” are generally associated with 
his writings and ideas.100  Pigou argued that government regulation be-
came more justified, and even necessary, when there was a “divergence 
between social and private net product.”101  When this divergence exists, 
it is the government’s job to reduce the divergence, usually in the form of 
a tax.102 
In more general and modern terms, an externality is defined as a 
cost associated with an economic behavior that is not internalized103 by 
the actor: a cost that the actor does not have to pay for when engaging in 
that particular behavior.104  As a result, “the individual who engages in 
such activities will be relieved of some of the future costs.”105  In the 
context of healthcare insurance, there is a reciprocal effect when some 
consumers do not have to pay the future costs of an activity, which 
means that “other individuals will have to pay higher premiums or will 
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have lower benefits . . . . ”106  In order to reduce or eliminate the external 
costs of an activity, the government may need to tax that activity at a 
level that will better reflect the activity’s true costs.107 
Because of the growing body of evidence linking sugary-beverage 
overconsumption to obesity, it is likely that such consumption creates 
externalities;108 the overconsumption of sugary beverages generates ob-
esity-related healthcare costs that the consumer does not internalize when 
choosing to engage in that consumption activity.  As already noted in 
Part II, it is estimated that the cost of obesity on the healthcare system is 
roughly $147 billion per year.109  Public health programs, for instance 
Medicaid and Medicare, currently pay for half of these obesity-related 
health problems,110 which means that taxpayers already bear a significant 
portion of the U.S. healthcare costs associated with obesity.  Though ob-
esity-related health problems are caused by many factors,111 the empirical 
correlation discussed in the NEJM study112 indicates that sugary-
beverage consumption is an activity that contributes to many obesity-
related health problems.  Consequently, the consumption of sugary beve-
rages, which has been shown to lead to obesity-related disease, creates 
external costs borne by society as a whole: costs that individual sugary-
beverage consumers do not bear. 
In light of the externalities associated with sugary-beverage con-
sumption and obesity, government regulation in the form of a sin tax is a 
legitimate and proper response.  In economic terms, the consumption of 
sugary beverages creates a social cost—obesity-related healthcare—that 
is not a component of a good’s price.113  As one commentator has put it, 
“[I]ndividuals acting in their own self-interest . . . will not effectively 
address the problem [of obesity] because they do not internalize some of 
the major costs or benefits of action or nonaction.”114  Implementing a 
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tax on the externality-generating activity is one way to make a good’s 
true cost reflective in its price.115  Taxes increase a good’s price, forcing 
consumers to pay an amount that better reflects the true cost of that activ-
ity.116 
The externalities of sugary-beverage consumption should be ad-
dressed by implementing a sin tax on sugary beverages because such a 
tax will reduce and help to eliminate some of the externalities incurred as 
a result of unhealthy consumption choices.  Moreover, the revenue raised 
from these taxes will, and should, be used to pay for the healthcare costs 
associated with obesity-related health problems.117  Professor Jeff Strnad 
has discussed in detail how food taxes on unhealthy food are best viewed 
as “implicit premiums” because the taxes are used to pay for 
the healthcare costs incurred.118  Regardless of how such taxes are 
framed, a sin tax on soda is needed to address the externalities associated 
with unhealthy levels of consumption. 
The use of sin taxes to address externalities in consumer consump-
tion is not a unique or new public policy approach.119  Taxation of un-
healthy products such as cigarettes and alcohol already exist at the feder-
al level.120  Historically, federal taxes on tobacco and alcohol were im-
plemented as early as 1862.121  While the initial rationale for such taxa-
tion was to raise revenue, modern reasons for the taxation of alcohol and 
cigarettes has shifted.122  Similar to the proposed tax on sugary beverag-
es, the taxation of alcohol and cigarettes is often justified on the grounds 
that consumption of these unhealthy products creates externalities unac-
counted for in the untaxed price of a good.123  Like sugary beverages, the 
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externalities of tobacco and alcohol consumption reflect the increased 
healthcare costs of using unhealthy products.124 
While opponents of a sin tax on sugary beverages are quick to point 
out the differences between cigarette consumption and sugary-beverage 
consumption,125 such as the addictive nature of cigarettes and the effects 
of secondhand smoke on nonsmokers, the externalities on the public 
healthcare system from unhealthy consumption are quite similar. For 
example, healthcare and lost productivity costs from cigarette consump-
tion in the U.S. are estimated at $193 billion per year.126  Smoking is at-
tributed to 443,000 premature deaths annually.127  Likewise, healthcare 
costs from obesity-related diseases cost an estimated $147 billion per 
year and are associated with 300,000 premature deaths per year.128  Giv-
en these similarities in the external costs of consumption, it is unsurpris-
ing that similar policy responses, such as sin taxes, should be used to ad-
dress and reduce the external costs of sugary-beverage consumption. 
To further illustrate the external costs of unhealthy consumption, 
consider the example that one commentator, M. Todd Henderson, dis-
cusses in arguing for “nanny” type regulation of unhealthy consumption 
in a private firm.129  Henderson depicts a smoker and a nonsmoker who 
both work at a private firm. In this scenario, “[t]he nonsmoker wants the 
firm to take steps to reduce the incidence of smoking or charge the 
smoker the costs he imposes on the firm, since otherwise the nonsmoker 
pays for them.”130  This is exactly the type of situation “where third par-
ties bear some costs of others’ behavior.”131  Additionally, this microeco-
nomics example is easily extrapolated to the macro level, where “the cur-
rent healthcare model puts most of the costs on third parties, namely 
firms and the government . . . .”132  This observation about the aggregate 
and societal costs of unhealthy consumption becomes even more relevant 
in light of recent healthcare reforms.133  While little research exists at the 
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moment, the passage of the Affordable Care Act in late March 2010 has 
already precipitated commentary about how compulsory health insurance 
and the inability to refuse patients for pre-existing conditions will further 
spread the costs of serious illness across society.134  Given the increasing 
inevitability of externalities related to public health, “we should expect 
each of these types of organizations (governments and firms) to provide 
nannyism to reduce these costs.”135 
The external costs of unhealthy consumption justify and necessitate 
government policy making aimed at curbing unhealthy dietary choices. 
The growing body of science and research indicate that sugary-beverage 
consumption and obesity are clearly linked.  Thus, the externalities of 
unhealthy consumption impose costs on society: costs that justify gov-
ernment regulation in the form of a sin tax. 
V. OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED SIN TAX ON SUGARY BEVERAGES 
The possible implementation of a federal sin tax on sugary beve-
rages raises several objections.  As already noted, government regulation 
and policy making in the realm of lifestyle and consumption choices is 
not a new development.136  The regulation of drugs, alcohol, and ciga-
rettes has occurred since the inception of the country, and continues to 
this day.137  Sin taxes are also not a new means of government regulation 
and intervention into the lifestyle choices of citizens, given that alcohol 
and cigarettes have been the subject of sin taxes for many years.138 Con-
sequently, the sin tax’s use as a means of implementing public policy, 
whether to raise revenue, deter unhealthy behavior, or both, is not a radi-
cal, extreme, or even unexpected expansion of governmental regulation. 
While a strong policy-making precedent exists for the use of sin 
taxes to address public health issues, however, policy making in the 
realm of lifestyle choices has raised vehement opposition.139  Derogative 
generalities such as the “nanny state,” “big brother,” and “food police” 
are some of the characterizations used by citizens who oppose govern-
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ment regulation in the form of a sin tax on sugary beverages.140  This Part 
of the Comment will discuss three central objections to implementing a 
federal sin tax on sugary beverages. 141  First, paternalistic policies such 
as sin taxes infringe on liberty and autonomy values.  Second, empirical 
evidence shows that sin taxes are generally regressive and are thus unfair 
because the poor pay a disproportionate amount of their income in sin 
taxes than upper-income brackets.  Last, opponents of a sin tax on sugary 
beverages contend that taxing sugary beverages embarks upon a march 
down the slippery slope of intrusive policy making that will eventually 
lead to government taxation and regulation of anything viewed as un-
healthy. After considering each argument, this Comment will re-
articulate why a sin tax on sugary beverages should nonetheless be im-
plemented. 
A. Sugary-Beverage Taxes Infringe on Autonomy Values 
Paternalistic policies, like sin taxes, are often opposed because 
these policies infringe on autonomy values like freedom of choice.142  
This argument supposes that the values of liberty and autonomy should 
take precedence in policy-making decisions over other values, such as 
increased public health and general welfare, and any increase in paterna-
listic policy making involves a reciprocal decrease in autonomy.143 
Autonomy values are important for two main reasons.  First, respect 
for autonomy in policy making is a powerful concern because liberty, 
autonomy, and free choice are deeply embedded principles in the Ameri-
can consciousness.144  The value of liberty from government intervention 
was articulated by nineteenth-century philosopher John Stuart Mill.  Mill 
argued that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others.”145  This principle of liberty from government 
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intervention pervades to this day, and the historical, cultural, and tradi-
tional respect for autonomy is one of the rationales for opposing paterna-
listic policies like sin taxes. 
Second, policy makers should respect autonomy values above other 
values because autonomy is central to human dignity and the moral be-
lief that humans are “ends in themselves.”146  Indeed, there seems to be a 
human-dignity interest in allowing individuals to make their own life-
style choices free from government intervention.147  Respecting individu-
al actors as autonomous moral agents means letting individuals form 
their own conception of welfare and happiness.148  When the government 
attempts to change an individual’s conception of what is “good,” like 
implementing sin taxes on lifestyle choices, the government is not res-
pecting that individual as an autonomous moral agent.149  Thus, policies 
that infringe on liberty do not respect humans as autonomous moral 
agents—humans as “ends in themselves”—and therefore, these policies 
should not be implemented. 
While these autonomy-based arguments should not be discarded, 
they are insufficient to overcome the many reasons in favor of imple-
menting a sin tax on sugary beverages.  At its heart, the debate over 
whether to use a sin tax on sugary beverages involves weighing compet-
ing policy concerns.  Autonomy is a deeply embedded American value 
that should be weighed and respected when making public-policy deci-
sions; but, it is only one value among many that policy makers must con-
sider and evaluate.  The decision whether to implement a sin tax on su-
gary beverages involves a policy trade-off between autonomy on the one 
hand, and the possibility of increased welfare (public health) and fairness 
on the other.  Because a sin tax on sugary beverages will increase welfare 
and fairness, while only minimally encroaching on autonomy, it is a pol-
icy that should be implemented. 
First, a sin tax on sugary beverages will increase the overall welfare 
of consumers because it will help reduce unhealthy consumption, which 
will in turn help to lower obesity-related health problems.  As the re-
search promulgated by the NEJM150 shows, reducing consumption of 
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sugary beverages will likely lead to increased health and thus increased 
welfare.151  The sin tax provides a disincentive to engage in unhealthy 
and expensive consumption choices.  Furthermore, the well-documented 
cognitive and informational failures that plague consumers indicate that 
uninfluenced consumption choices may not produce the best welfare-
generating results.152  Left uninfluenced by the economic and health in-
centives of a sugary-beverage tax, less than perfectly rational consumers 
will undoubtedly continue to engage in levels of consumption that will 
continue to cause obesity-related health problems.  Although a sin tax 
will partially infringe on principles of autonomy, this infringement is 
minimal compared to the potential increase in health and welfare. 
Second, a sin tax on sugary beverages will increase fairness.  A sin 
tax on sugary beverages will address the externalities of obesity-related 
healthcare, which increases fairness by better allocating the previously 
unaccounted costs of overconsumption.153  Like autonomy, fairness, es-
pecially in matters of tax policy, is a deeply embedded principle in the 
American and human consciousness.154 
A sin tax on sugary beverages will increase fairness because su-
gary-beverage consumption contributes to obesity-related healthcare 
costs: costs that impose externalities on the public healthcare system.155  
A sugary-beverage tax will increase the costs of unhealthy consumption, 
which forces consumers to pay for the true costs of unhealthy consump-
tion, rather than impose those costs on third parties.  In turn, the revenue 
generated by sin taxes can be used to pay for the currently unaccounted 
costs of obesity-related healthcare.  Because sugary-beverage consump-
tion generates externalities and imposes costs on third parties, policies 
that address these external costs are justified on fairness grounds. 
Lastly, while policies such as sin taxes theoretically impinge upon 
autonomy interests, in reality sin taxes infringe very little on autonomy 
and liberty.  Rather than banning a product or activity outright, sin-tax 
policies merely provide economic and health-related incentives not to 
consume an unhealthy product; the final choice whether to consume or 
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not still remains unabridged.  Sin taxes do not impede the autonomous 
functioning of adults, but instead help coax and cajole those autonomous 
adults into healthier decision making. 
In sum, autonomy-based reasons for opposing a sin tax on sugary 
beverages are unpersuasive. When the benefits of the tax—increased 
welfare and fairness—are weighed against the minimal infringement on 
autonomy values, it is apparent that principles of autonomy provide very 
little reason for opposing the sin tax. 
B. A Sugary-Beverage Sin Tax Would Be Regressive 
Another argument against sin taxes is that they are inherently re-
gressive and thus unfair to poorer demographics.156  Similar to a flat sales 
tax, which implements the percentage of tax for using a product no mat-
ter what the consumer’s income, sin taxes force lower-income consumers 
to pay the same tax for using a sin-taxed product as a person in a higher 
income bracket.157  This results in a wealthy person paying a much 
smaller percentage of his or her overall income to consume an unhealthy 
product as a poorer person.158  This type of tax system produces inequity 
because it cuts against the “whole system of progressive taxation and 
[wealth] redistribution” that undergirds our system of taxation.159  For 
example, “smokers from the working-class spend more of their income 
on cigarettes than smokers who are professionals.”160 
Though sin taxes may be regressive and thus somewhat inequitable, 
leaving the externalities of obesity-related healthcare unaddressed raises 
similar fairness concerns.161  Sin taxes may impose unfair tax burdens on 
the poor, but when properly used,162 those taxes will help pay for the 
healthcare costs related to unhealthy consumption, which also dispropor-
tionately affect the poor.163  Because sugary-beverage consumption gene-
rates externalities, leaving unhealthy consumption untaxed may be 
viewed as equally unfair to those taxpayers supporting public healthcare. 
Additionally, the proposed sin tax should have the effect of reduc-
ing the consumption of sugary beverages, which reduces the regressive 
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2010] Federal Sin Tax on Sugary Beverages 295 
nature of the tax by steering consumers to healthier, untaxed beverages 
because empirical studies indicate that poorer populations are more sen-
sitive to price changes.164  The NEJM study addresses the regressive na-
ture of sugary-beverage taxation by noting that “[t]he sugar-sweetened 
beverages are not necessary for survival, and an alternative (i.e., water) is 
available at little or no cost; hence, a tax that shifted intake from sugar-
sweetened beverages to water would benefit the poor both by improving 
health and by lowering expenditures on beverages.”165  In other words, 
the main goal of the sin tax on sugary beverages is to deter unhealthy 
consumption of sugary beverages, which will ideally result in both in-
creased health and less expenditure on the taxed product.  Thus, sin-tax 
policies often have the result of reducing for some, and eliminating for 
others, the chosen behavior that leads to the claim of unfair taxation. 
C. Slippery Slope: Taxing Sugary Beverages Will Lead to More Invasive 
Government Regulation 
Opponents of a sin tax on sugary beverages also raise a concern that 
taxing sugary beverages will lead to similar taxation of other products 
only marginally or speculatively linked to obesity.166  This argument is 
often referred to as the slippery-slope argument. A slippery-slope argu-
ment is an argument “suggesting that a proposed policy or course of ac-
tion that might appear desirable now, when taken in isolation, is in fact 
undesirable (or less desirable) because it increases the likelihood of un-
desirable policies being adopted in the future.”167  Critics of the sin tax 
on sugary beverages fear that expanding government regulation into oth-
er areas of lifestyle choices will open the proverbial floodgates of any 
and all lifestyle regulation.  Once it becomes acceptable to specially re-
gulate sugary beverages, there seems to be little in the way stopping pol-
icy makers from regulating other unhealthy foods and products, for in-
stance fast food, junk food, cream-based pastas, and numerous other un-
healthy choices available to consumers.168  Fear of expanded government 
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regulation into everyday lifestyle choices is based on simple chain of 
logic: because sugary beverages are sufficiently unhealthy to tax as a 
“sinful” behavior, any product viewed as a similarly unhealthy product 
can be the subject of government regulation and tax.169 
Opposition to a sin tax may be due to the fact that the consumption 
of sugary beverages seems to differ quite drastically from other sin-taxed 
items, such as cigarettes.170  Perhaps the most obvious differentiating 
characteristics are that cigarettes have highly addictive properties and 
secondhand environmental effects.  These differences seem to justify 
government regulation: higher taxation to deter consumption.  In con-
trast, the addictive nature of sugary beverages is less obvious, or at least 
presently undocumented.171  And sugary-beverage consumption gene-
rates no secondhand environmental effects.  Put another way, a some-
what clear line existed when only cigarettes were subject to a sin tax,172 
and allowing the taxation of sugary beverages blurs that line.  This asser-
tion, that no clear line can be drawn between presently desirable policies 
and future undesirable policies, is a common theme of slippery-slope 
arguments, which often pose the (rhetorical) question: “If we do allow 
the practice or policy under consideration, then where would we draw the 
line?”173 In other words, slippery-slope arguments are an assertion that 
“we can draw no rationally defensible line between the practice or policy 
under consideration and some clearly objectionable one.”174 
Although the slippery-slope argument raises possible concerns of 
government overencroachment, it is an unpersuasive and distracting rea-
son to oppose a sin tax on sugary beverages.175  As an initial matter, the 
unpersuasiveness of the slippery-slope argument is demonstrated by the 
nature of the democratic process. Slippery-slope reasoning in the politi-
cal context is unpersuasive because it mischaracterizes the policy-making 
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process as one based largely on precedent.  In a democratic society, 
every new policy must be rigorously debated and adequately supported 
in order to become the law of the land.  This process necessarily eschews 
slippery-slope reasoning because the democratic vetting process ensures 
that there are real, legitimate, and popularly supported reasons for im-
plementing a policy—as opposed to reasons that are merely precedential.  
To clear this democratic hurdle, a new policy must do much more than 
show that similar laws have already been passed and similar precedent 
has been set. 
American history provides poignant examples of how the federal 
lawmaking process operates independent of slippery-slope reasoning and 
influence, further illustrating why slippery-slope arguments are an unper-
suasive reason to oppose a sin tax on sugary beverages.  Perhaps the 
most salient example is the prohibition movement in the early twentieth 
century.  The Eighteenth Amendment, which made the sale of alcoholic 
beverages illegal in the United States, was repealed by the Twenty-First 
Amendment after it was determined to be extremely unpopular and un-
workable in practice.176  The example of prohibition illustrates the li-
mited value that lawmakers place or should place on similar policy 
precedent: past legislation is no reason to implement future legislation, 
and each policy decision must be evaluated on its own merits.  Slippery-
slope reasoning is faulty and unpersuasive in the policy context because 
(1) it places too much weight on the value of policy precedent; and (2) it 
fails to account for an active public that is constantly evaluating and test-
ing current policies. 
Furthermore, as the above critique implies, the invocation of the 
slippery-slope argument is often a tangential distraction that inhibits true 
debate about the merits of the policy under consideration.  Inhibition of 
debate arises because slippery-slope arguments are based largely on fear 
and exaggeration.  The heart of the sin-tax debate is not whether future, 
potentially more invasive policies will be risked by adopting a sin tax on 
sugary beverages.  The sin-tax debate—one that still must pass through a 
democratically elected Congress—is about the value of personal respon-
sibility and autonomy on the one hand, and increasing fairness and the 
welfare of citizens on the other.  It is also about whether the government 
can increase individual welfare more efficiently than individuals them-
selves.  There are empirical and theoretical arguments on each side of 
this debate, but there is no room for fear-mongering about how sin-tax 
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policy will automatically lead to other and more expansive sin-tax poli-
cies. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The proposed federal sin tax on sugary beverages made by the 
NEJM has many benefits.  It will provide an economic incentive for in-
dividuals to make better, healthier choices in the products they consume, 
and it will help address and improve some of the cognitive deficiencies 
inherent in human decision making.  The tax will increase the overall 
health of society by lowering the amount of unhealthy consumption.  
Moreover, the tax will increase the fairness of the public health insurance 
system by considering currently unaccounted-for externalities in con-
sumption.  Furthermore, the revenues from the tax will be used to pay for 
programs directly associated with the tax.  Such programs include subsi-
dizing healthier food, funding nutritional educational programs, and pay-
ing for the healthcare associated with obesity-related ailments.  Thus, 
there are many benefits to such a tax. 
But while the sin tax on sugary beverages has many benefits, some 
citizens are concerned that these policies are an unprecedented en-
croachment into personal autonomy that should not be imposed.  Propo-
nents of this view believe that autonomy should be a paramount policy 
concern and personal choice should be respected even if it results in un-
healthy consumption choices.  While these policy concerns are legiti-
mate, they are blind to the epidemic of obesity that America is facing.  
Respecting personal choice as an end in itself will merely enforce the 
status quo of widespread obesity-related health problems—a status quo 
that will both kill and bankrupt America.  Problems of this magnitude 
require large-scale action that only the federal government can mobilize. 
More importantly, while the proposed federal sin tax on sugary be-
verages provides a major starting point in addressing the obesity-related 
health problems America is facing, it is not an ending point, and it is cer-
tainly not a panacea.  America’s response to the obesity epidemic re-
quires more than a sin tax on sugary beverages, and it requires more than 
just government-imposed policy.  An effective response must include 
educational programs, private sector reform, and increased individual 
responsibility. 
